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HANAN BADR
RÉSUMÉ / ABSTRACT
Les conséquences politiques des réseaux virtuels dans les pays arabes 
sont complexes et imprévisibles. Le corpus à ce sujet demeure fragmenté 
et ses résultats sont empiriques et peu conclusifs. Cela s’explique par un 
certain nombre de facteurs, notamment le grand nombre de disciplines 
et d’approches théoriques à l’œuvre pour ce qui constitue un phéno-
mène nouveau pour les sciences sociales ; la rapidité de l’évolution et le 
dynamisme de cet environnement ; la quantité massive des données et 
les problèmes de méthodologie. 
Cet article plaide pour une vision plus équilibrée et nuancée des 
réseaux virtuels et de leur potentiel de démocratisation. La recherche sur 
les réseaux virtuels dans les pays arabes, plutôt que de s’attacher à en 
prouver le déterminisme, devrait se pencher sur l’évolution de l’interac-
tion entre la communication en ligne et les acteurs hors ligne à mesure 
que ces derniers se développent.
MOTS CLÉS :
Réseaux sociaux, sphère publique, culture politique, médias de 
masse, Egypte.
The political effects of social media in the Arab countries are com-
plex and unpredictable. The body of literature remains fragmented 
with inconclusive empirical results due to a number of factors like 
the multitude of disciplines and theoretical approaches, being a new 
phenomenon in social sciences, the fast developments and dynamic 
settings, the massive data, and questions of methodology. This article 
argues for a more balanced and nuanced view of social media and 
their democratization potential. In this sense, research on social media 
in Arab countries should not aim to prove certain determinism, but 
rather study the shifting interplay of online communication and ofline 
actors as they develop over time.
KEYWORDS:
Social Media, Public Sphere, Political Culture, Mass Media, Egypt.
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HANAN BADR
LIMITATIONS OF THE SOCIAL MEDIA 
EUPHORIA IN COMMUNICATION STUDIES
FACEBOOK REVOLUTION: INITIAL EUPHORIA AT DIGITAL 
MOBILIZATION
The Arab uprisings generated a wave of research that insisted on 
the democratizating effects of social media. Literature on social media 
and the Arab uprisings highlighted and celebrated the revolutionary 
role of social media as a central tool in voicing political demands 
and social grievances as well as facilitating protests and organizing 
networks beyond the control of state and private mass media.1 The 
massive public mobilizations and the following events that transpired 
in the Arab region were quickly coined the “Facebook Revolution”, a 
term that linked the outcome of the protests with the social network 
Facebook in particular. Studies on the irst wave of the “Arab Spring” 
and online activism initially relected a sense of victory and euphoria 
after the fall of Mubarak.2 True, during the Tahrir protests social media 
and mobile networks facilitated exchanges among protesters through 
communication nodes.3 
Even before 2011, research tended to argue that technological 
advancements would reinforce media liberalization; Egypt’s vibrant 
blogosphere had already been a focus of study as bloggers challenged 
mainstream media agendas and public deliberations.4 The indings of 
these studies supported the “liberation technology” paradigm. In this 
context liberation technology is deined as “any form of information and 
communication technology (ICT) that can expand political, social, and 
1. For example see Khamis and Vaughn, 2011; Lim, 2012; Abdulla, 2011. 
2. For example see Abdulla, 2011; Shirky, 2011.
3. Howard and Husain, 2013, pp. 5-6.
4. Loewenstein, 2008; Pole, 2010.
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economic freedom.”5 The role of social media in revitalizing the public 
sphere was not only relevant to Arab autocracies. While scholars of 
social media in authoritarian settings focused on the shifting balance of 
state-society relations due to the erosion of complete sovereignty over 
communication6, research of social media in Western democracies 
witnessing a crisis of growing political disinterest dealt with online 
forms of public participation and civic initiatives to reclaim the public 
sphere.7 Accordingly, the Internet was able to revive stagnant political 
landscapes through the communication of ordinary citizens.8
In 2011, analysis of empirical evidence in Arab countries seemed 
to recognize the social media effects in the political arena. Three main 
arguments supported the euphoric estimations of social media effects 
on politics. The irst and most elaborated argument is that the Internet 
changed and expanded the notion of the public sphere. In this regard, 
the public sphere theory, inspired mainly from Habermas’ seminal 
works9, is strongly present in the analysis of political communication 
during and after the Arab uprisings. Theoretically, this connects to the 
anti-hegemonic counter-public sphere concepts that are promoted 
by marginalized actors.10 The argument goes that decentralized 
communication through social media enables wider segments of the 
public to openly participate in the communication process.11 The 
Internet could then give those marginalized actors a chance to challenge 
the mainstream public sphere. Weak political and social actors get the 
opportunity to use social networking sites to promote their views or 
uncover events overlooked by the established media system. Online 
discourses seemed to fulil “media utopian ideals”12 by providing access 
and equality for all users. Indeed, in recent years social networking 
sites were increasingly used by civic society, such as advocacy groups, 
civic initiatives, social movements, non-governmental organizations, 
which otherwise would have limited access to the established media 
system whether due to political exclusion or weak resources13. 
The second euphoric argument regards the communicative acts 
online as a practice of citizenship14. Hereby the communication itself 
5. Diamond, 2010, p. 70.
6. Lamer, 2012.
7. Ghannam, 2011; Tufecki, 2014.
8. For example see Stromer-Galley and Wichowski, 2013, pp. 169.
9. Habermas, 1990, 1998.
10. Wimmer, 2007.
11. Lim, 2012.
12. Schmidt, 2013, p. 46. 
13. Ibid.
14. Dahlgren, 2000, pp. 335-340.
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serves as a form of civic participation or self-expression that turns the 
individuals from passive consumers into active producers, especially in 
the political arena. So the Internet would possibly enable the citizens 
to reclaim the colonized sphere of politics and consequently add 
pluralism and diversity to political civic culture, the argument goes.
Finally, the third euphoric aspect of social media inluence in 
political communication is the inter-media agenda setting function. 
This term refers to the increasing ability of social media to shape 
traditional news media agenda, which is manifested in selection and 
highlighting mechanisms as well as increased frequency of coverage.15 
New thematic inputs from online debates can shape the news agenda 
of traditional media.16 Online contents become more visible and 
accessible to wider segments of the public, even to those who lack 
online access. In addition, online gatekeeping processes do not operate 
in the classic linear sense as in journalism, which is more constrained 
by political and economic ties of the media enterprises. The web offers 
a more open potential of acquiring data and information. This does 
not negate a certain degree of a “digital gatekeeping process(es)”17, 
as evident for example in search engines that generate content for 
users; a process that shows in sorting and selection criteria of search 
results, that prioritize the browsing process and can be described as 
a source of “subtle power”18. Despite this less visible gatekeeping, 
the post-Mubarak era showed numerous examples of the responsive 
reaction of the mass media or an increased public awareness to online 
campaigns on Twitter or Facebook. Women’s rights in particular were 
a major focus in these online campaigns19. Social media, therefore, 
break the monopoly of traditional elites and successfully put neglected 
topics on the media agenda.20 Social media trends that generate high 
visibility online make it onto news media, and vice versa, traditional 
newspapers and TV content provide information and views that feed 
online discussions. In this way, we can, therefore, speak of a social 
media and mainstream media symbiosis, because in practice they 
both beneit from each other, even if they operate under different 
selection logics.
The complex paths of transformation in the different Arab countries 
that witnessed mass uprisings weakened the euphoric “big effects” 
paradigm that was ascribed to the Internet and social media in the 
15. Brettschneider, 2002, p. 635.
16. Emmer and Wolling, 2010,  p. 48-49
17. Röhle, 2010, p. 33.
18. Ibid.




beginning. Recently, new literature trends emerged that normalize 
the view on social media, or even shed some negative light on it. The 
following part will elaborate more on the main counter-arguments for 
a euphoric notion of the social media.
LIMITATIONS OF THE SOCIAL MEDIA EUPHORIA IN THE 
ARAB SPRING
Unlike the initial assumption that social media positively affects 
politics, months after the uprisings more cautious analyses started to 
appear. Marc Lynch spoke of a “Twitter devolution” elaborating his main 
argument that social media can actually “harm the political landscape” 
in the Arab region.21 On another note, Greg Burris highlighted the 
asymmetric power constellations of Arab bloggers when he described 
a dilemma he termed “Lawrence of E-rabia”22. He described the “trap” 
of the young Arab bloggers who are represented as using “western 
technology” to liberate their countries. Thus, mass media discourse 
tends to reproduce Neo-orientalist tendencies in the interpretations 
of the Arab uprising. Yet at the same time Arab online activists need 
Western coverage to push their demands to a global audience and exert 
pressure on their regime. In their article on the Fourth Arab Bloggers 
meeting, Enrico de Angelis and Donatella della Ratta23 outlined the 
opposing perspectives on viewing online activism in practice on the 
one hand and in academia on the other. While bloggers estimate 
themselves as pioneers of change in society, scholars tend to highlight 
their limitations. 
The main aim of this article is to call for a more nuanced reading 
of social media effects in the context of the Arab Spring. In order to do 
so, ive elements should be taken into consideration to contextualize 
political communication via social media within the broader context of 
political, social, and media systems.
1. The irst element raises concern over the initial overestimation 
of social media effects. The use of social media by the opposition in 
preparation for massive demonstrations cannot be neglected, but we 
cannot speak of a mere “Facebook Revolution”. True, the activists 
could utilize social media to construct alternative social realities 
and convey information and emotions to a wider, mainly apolitical, 
audience. But social media are not capable of changing the system 
21. Lynch, 2013.
22. Burris, 2011.
23. De Angelis and della Ratta, 2014.
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of governing rules in a given political or legal system, as the term 
revolution suggests. The wide-spread term “Facebook Revolution” 
heightened expectations from social media and opened the door to a 
debate on (social) media effects. Media-effects research is characterized 
by inconclusive empirical results and a multitude of intervening 
variables, like previous attitudes, knowledge, experiences, and etc.24. 
Balanced research on democratization and communication tends to 
regard the media, whether old or new, as a catalyst, not a cause25. As 
Jeffrey Ghannam concluded, the increasing use of social media along 
convergence mechanisms is expected to change the news environment 
and community engagement, as well as public expectations. However, 
social media alone, as already stated, cannot change the political 
system.26 This means that a certain role is ascribed to the media, but this 
role should be contextualized within other circumstances of a political, 
social and economic nature. 
In addition, several other empirical indicators do counter the initial 
simplistic stimuli-response arguments that claim that social media has 
a causal effect in the Arab Spring. In regards to Egypt, the working 
paper on World Protests 2006-2013 shows that the number of protests 
had increased, especially with two notable peaks in January 2011 
and June 201327. But the general upward trend of protesting does not 
relect the increasingly growing numbers of social media users in a 
clear consecutive ascending linear pattern. Empirical indicators show 
that people learned about the protests primarily through interpersonal 
communication using Facebook, phone contact, or face-to-face 
conversation, at least on the irst day.28 Another piece of evidence for 
the relative effect of social media is that during the “unprecedented 
telecommunications black hole”29 during the 18 days of revolt against 
Mubarak, people reverted to the use of traditional communication 
tools like landline phones and lealets30. From another angle, additional 
factors like popular unrest, intensity of grievances or socio-economic 
reasons play an important role in mobilizing or de-mobilizing people. 
These indicators again emphasize the role of media as a catalyst, not 
an agent of change. 
24. Kepplinger, 2009, p. 701-702.
25. Hafez, 2005; Ayish, 2012.
26. Ghannam, 2011, p.23.
27. Ortiz et. Al, 2013.





The overestimation of social media effects resulted in a so-called 
“Tahrir bubble”31, which refers to online exaggerations as well as the 
occasional disconnection of bloggers from the real world and their 
decreased public credibility amongst the wider public. This does not 
rule out various empirical indicators of the success, albeit limited, of 
social media in public campaigning, causing occasional pressure on 
the government, and forcing a reaction to a socio-economic demand.32 
Four years after the Tahrir uprising social media seemed more promising 
in achieving change when utilized in single-issue campaigns instead 
of calling for general causes of social and political change. A new 
perspective interprets even the successful Tahrir protests as practically 
a single issue campaign; it was a rare moment of a “single narrative of 
popular revolt”33, especially when all oppositional groups united their 
chants for their removal of Mubarak and his regime. The chants of the 
uprisings embodied the most unifying and consensual call beyond the 
traditional lines dividing the oppositional groups.
2. From a normative point of view democratization theory postulates 
that media enables deliberation and adds transparency through political 
communication. Theoretically, this questions the extent of political 
effects of social media. What transformative power of the regime and 
citizenry do social media have? How can social media transform the 
political system or the political culture, if they can at all? 
As mentioned above, media have the potential to function as 
a catalyst to accelerate change, but they are not a sole variable in 
the political bargaining processes. In a recent study, Zeynep Tufecki 
concludes that in just a few years social media in Egypt opened the 
public sphere to an extent that makes it “almost chaotic”.34 Neither 
governments are able to regain full control over information and nor 
can dissidents utilize the new means of communication to fully impact 
policy.35As in most transformation periods, systematic change needs 
negotiations among key players. This happens through a dialogue 
between social and political actors, who engage in political bargaining 
31. Lynch, 2013.
32. A recent example is the pressure caused by social media in the Aida 
Seoudy case. Seoudy, a radio presenter, was ired for criticizing the acquittal 
of Mubarak in his second trial in 2014. Eventually, the president stepped in to 
reinstate her as a radio moderator.  Further vivid examples showing how social 
media change the real world is the growing discussions on female harassment, 
a topic pushed by civic society into the mainstream media agenda. See Nader, 
2014.
33. Lynch, 2013.
34. Tufecki, 2014, p.4.
35. Ibid, p.16.
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to bring forth transformation processes.36 In regards to Egypt, the 
transformation shows both “elements of rupture and stability”37, which 
are better analysed outside the rigid dichotomy of democratic change 
or authoritarian resilience.38 The return to old-style repression by the 
regime and the polarization of the oppositions predicts an ongoing 
learning and adapting process for both sides, which means constant 
tension for the next few years.39 This will have long-term effects on 
the changing public sphere, because until now the Arab upheavals 
did not fully empower either side completely. The new information 
environment makes the costs of repression higher by lowering the 
barriers and increasing visibility.40
One cannot only speak of an “active new citizenry”41, as Asef Bayat 
recently put it, referring to the effects of the various political moments 
loaded with indeinite possibilities which demanded a creative fusion 
of the old and new ways of doing politics.42 The broad information 
environment, as noted by Lynch, also includes the state as an actor. 
However, state intervention via information and communication 
technology is still under researched. Technology might offer liberation, 
but also enables state surveillance and censorship processes.43 So if 
the events of the Arab Spring caught the regimes off guard, it does not 
mean that they would not be able to learn new ways to contain dissent. 
By controlling and manipulating the public sphere, the Arab regimes, 
which usually lack vision, as well as reformative and competitive 
policies, have, however learned the “wrong lessons” from the 
uprisings.44 They learned to join and beat the new medium to enhance 
control instead of freedoms.45 Indeed, the Egyptian counter-revolution 
developed a wide range of mechanisms and strategies to interrupt and 
distort the information lows produced by the opposition.46 Regime-
loyal non-democratic groups learned to use social media in order to 
disseminate their pro-stability frames by copying methods originally 
developed by civic society.47 This means that the Internet became a tool 
36. Hafez, 2005.
37. Rivetti, 2014, p.6.
38. Ibid.
39. Tufecki, 2014, p.16.
40. Lynch, 2014, p. 91, p.96.
41. Bayat, 2015. 
42. Ibid.
43. Fish, 2009, p. 44.
44. Osman, 2014.
45. Tufecki, 2014, p.16. Heydemann and Leenders speak of an authoritarian 
learning process: Heydemann and Leenders, 2014, p. 78.
46. Badr and Demmelhuber, 2014, p. 156.
47. Badr, 2013, p. 401.
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for diffusing autocratic views as well. In fact, the ongoing dynamics in 
the public sphere still do not offer meaningful conclusions on the long-
term effects of social media on political life.
Instead of being caught up within a utopian or dystopian determinism, 
a promising concept, the “Fifth Estate”, offers a new theoretical 
perspective for analyzing the public sphere. The concept was developed 
by William Dutton to describe the growing networking effects of the 
Internet on the public sphere. The basic hypothesis is that the outcome 
of online political communication is not pre-determined. Instead, the 
Internet serves as a signiicant political resource that enhances the 
communicative power of citizens and other institutions. Accordingly, 
online political discourse is not a linear tool of liberation, but rather a 
changing pattern of governance across multiple sectors. The effects of 
the Internet are not inevitable or an inherent feature of the technology. 
No single actor is in control of the Internet; it is rather “a pluralistic 
interplay among a complex ecology of multiple actors”48. Dutton hence 
suggests the term “Fifth Estate” to describe these dynamics along other 
judicative, legislative and executive estates as well as the press as a 
Fourth Estate.49 Using this concept in the research ield of social media 
and political effects in the Arab countries is helpful because it offers 
open-ended categories for empirical analysis. It its the evolving public 
sphere in the current transformation period.
3. The growing role of Facebook in political dialogue for young 
Arabs can be described as a communicative breakthrough. At the same 
time, the increased use of online platforms for political communication 
relects weaknesses and blockages of the established media system. In 
other words, the rising popularity of Facebook for expressing political 
opinions relects the inability of mass media to address public needs 
and demands. In the Egyptian case, the media market (still) shows a 
number of restrictive characteristics: a high degree of state intervention 
(for example in media ownership or licence policy and requirements), 
a long tradition of limited freedom of expression, media enterprises 
facing economic dificulties, an underdeveloped professional culture of 
journalists, limited media credibility, lack of objectivity in media practice, 
and inally a high party press parallelism showing external pluralism 
and media bias.50 The unfolding events since 2011 only aggravated the 
media polarization and the severity of the legitimacy crisis. Thus, while 
48. Dutton, 2013, p. 42.
49. Ibid.
50. For a full account of the characteristics and problems in the Egyptian 
media system see UNESCO, 2013; El-Issawy, 2014; El Gody, 2009, pp. 731-
751. 
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the Internet offered platforms for new public discourses, the media 
system at large still harboured asymmetric and unfavourable conditions 
that might have blocked bargaining and communication processes that 
are necessary for the transition period. Mubarak’s old elites made use of 
their extensive media control of various private TV channels to counter 
the liberalizing messages instead of being impartial mediators51.
4. The initial euphoria of social media overlooked factors limiting 
the role of social media as a free marketplace of ideas. The so-called 
“normalization thesis” argues against the liberation hypothesis and 
contextualizes online discourses within social and political structures. 
It postulates that the emerging free public spheres resemble more and 
more the established spheres in the ofline world. Accordingly, the online 
sphere would evolve to be just an extension of the traditional political 
sphere, where the strongest ofline, due to political or economic or 
institutional resources, would be also the strongest online.52 According 
to Nick Anstead and Andrew Chadwick normalization processes happen 
through commercialization, fragmentation, acquiring new skills by users 
or online communities, and inally the increasing regulatory body53, the 
latter often imposed by state institutions. Here the main focus lies in the 
commercialization processes. Social media show an increasing role 
in commercial communication since the network character is utilized 
by public relation departments, spin doctors or marketing specialists. 
Scholars draw attention to the “social contagion” in a non-political 
setting. Social media are regarded as a form of electronic word-
of-mouth by businesses and brands.54 In this sense, the information 
diffusion is not as spontaneous as ideally assumed by the public sphere 
theory. On the contrary, advertisements and sponsored posts follow the 
commercial logic. At the same time, business corporations use people’s 
opinions and ideas for market analysis. A growing share of commercial 
messages can colonize the online public sphere just as much as the 
ofline one. Hence, a commercialization of the online sphere takes 
place.
5. The ifth and inal issue on the limitations of social media is the 
fragmentation processes accelerated by the Internet. Studies on social 
media and democratization processes focussed on the assumption that 
the online public sphere achieves Neo-Kantian values like inclusion, 
accessibility, deliberation, and orientation towards the public good. 
Much has been written on the potential role of social media to expand 
51. Roll, 2013, p. 20.
52. Anstead and Chadwick, 2010, p. 58 .
53. Ward and Gibson, 2010, p. 34. 
54. Wu, Sun & Tan, 2013, p. 272.
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the public sphere. But the quality of the online public sphere and online 
deliberation within Arab countries received little scholarly attention 
until now. This is relevant because online political communication does 
not rule out a certain degree of exclusion55 as well as fragmentation. The 
Egyptian case of online communication via social media illustrates how 
characteristics of the radical polarized political culture shaped online 
communication patterns. Mutual exclusion processes, fragmentation 
mechanisms, and non-responsive communication took place online. In 
social media, hashtags and existing networks function as channelling 
mechanisms that can further fragment the exposure to online media 
instead of facilitate a common online experience56. Social media can 
actually increase selective exposure and further push the divisions, 
not only along the (shrinking) lines of the digital divide, but rather 
among those connected users who access the technology but choose 
different content and networks57. This results in the fragmentation of 
the public sphere and the retreat to the preferred ideological camp58. 
The Facebook group of Salafyo Costa is an exemplary case to illustrate 
how the social medium eventually failed in building a consensus 
among a heterogeneous group. Founded in March 2011, in order 
to help overcome the divisions between Salai Islamists and liberal 
seculars, the group’s credo was tolerance and co-existence.59 Unlike 
other Facebook groups the administrator team was greatly involved in 
facilitating online discussion forums by a rigorous set of rules for posts. 
The lack of a common religious and ideological ground among Salafyo 
Costa members shifted the focus towards “non-mobilizing”60 contents 
as well as social and charity issues. Inspired by religious conservative 
worldview, the Facebook group’s facilitation was highly restrictive. 
For example, rules included limiting the use of English language, 
banning offenses or verbal abuse, prohibiting mocking religions or 
missionary messages, etc. The group’s administrators usually responded 
accordingly either by banning members, deleting posts, or limiting 
visibility, etc. Yet, caught between two fronts, Islamists and liberals, the 
heterogeneous background of the group resulted in clashing political 
views and growing polarization regarding the rule of Morsi, and 
eventually became an obstacle for the group’s internal communication. 





59. Salafyo Costa operates autonomously from the traditional Salai sheikhs 
and their networks,  although some sheikhs remain as a source of religious 
and moral inspiration. Salafyo Costa  participated at sit-ins in Tahrir Square 
even when prominent Salai sheikhs had forbidden this. 
60. Interview with Mohamed Tolba, co-founder of Salafyo Costa, June 2012.
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from participating in or commenting on political events because it 
became impossible to overcome the divide. These developments show 
how online deliberation was affected by the radical polarized political 
culture. The strict rules on the online platform helped little in facilitating 
the dialogue. In this case, political divisions were too deep to ensure the 
minimum consensual framework for online communication. Access to 
social media alone does not enrich the public sphere if participants do 
not adhere to democratic values. So, online communication does not 
overcome the political and socio-economic dificulties per se. 
CONCLUSION: BEYOND SCEPTICISM AND EUPHORIA – 
THE NEED FOR SOCIAL MEDIA RESEARCH?
The political effects of social media in the Arab countries are 
complex and unpredictable. The body of literature remains fragmented 
with inconclusive empirical results due to a number of factors like 
the multitude of disciplines and theoretical approaches, being a new 
phenomenon in social sciences, the fast developments and dynamic 
settings, the massive data, questions of methodology, and training of 
communication researchers. This article argues for a more balanced 
and nuanced view of social media and their democratization potential. 
The above outlined issues that would lead to more balanced research 
on social media in the context of the Arab Spring. As Comunello and 
Anzera point out, it is essential to view the role of social media beyond 
dichotomous optimistic or pessimistic determinism61. In light of the 
above-mentioned issues, there is a need to move away from deterministic 
approaches, and towards conducting more in-depth research and 
integrating middle-range theories into a coherent meaningful study. 
Social media can strengthen communicative interactions, but the 
outcome is neither a direct result of the online medium nor necessarily 
causes a liberating effect. In Egypt both the regime and citizens learned 
and adapted ways to utilize the social media, and continue to do so 
in a new information and political environment. Here, the concept of 
the Fifth Estate is helpful because it offers open categories for analysis 
of networks of institutions and individuals in a way that considers the 
multitude of actors. At the same time, this concept connects social 
media to mass media, since they show symbiosis mechanisms. In this 
sense, research on social media in Arab countries should not aim to 
prove certain determinism, but rather study the shifting interplay of 
online communication and ofline actors as they develop over time.
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